

Administrative Reform in South Asian Countries: Law Enforcement in  
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh

Morshadul Hoque

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Approved by

Dr. William P. McLean, Thesis Advisor

Dr. Catherine C. Reese, Committee Member

Dr. David Harding, Committee Member

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## **ABSTRACT**

Morshadul Hoque

Administrative Reform in South Asian Countries: Law Enforcement in India, Pakistan,  
and Bangladesh

The quest for effective and efficient service delivery by the bureaucracy has long been a core issue in public administration. An honest, accountable, and service-oriented public administration is important, not only to act as a social and economic promoter, but also to consolidate democratic values. However, as non-elected government officials, bureaucrats are associated with some negative connotations: inefficient, lethargic, hostile, inflexible, imperious, and overpaid. Under such circumstances, scholars have stressed the need to increase the efficiency and responsiveness of civil servants to meet the demand of the people for whom they were recruited. The focus here is on reform in law enforcement and the overhaul of bureaupathologies, unnecessary rules and regulations, and red tape, which have created long term dissatisfaction among the citizens of developing countries.

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## **I. Statement of the Problem: Administrative Reform in South Asian Countries: Law Enforcement in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.**

The quest for effective and efficient service delivery by the bureaucracy has long been a core issue in public administration. An honest, accountable, and service-oriented public administration is important not only to act as a social and economic promoter, but also to consolidate democratic values (Khan, 1997). According to Max Weber (1946), in order to organize human activities bureaucracy is the most efficient and rational way. However, as non-elected government officials, bureaucrats are associated with some negative connotations: inefficient, lethargic, hostile, inflexible, imperious, and overpaid (Chittoo, Rampaul, and Nowbutsing, 2009), their emphasis on too many rules crippling the progress of an organization. In short, bureaucracy is something that everybody loves to hate (Goodsell, 1994). Under such circumstances, scholars have stressed the need to increase the efficiency and responsiveness of civil servants to meet the demand of the people for whom they were recruited (UNDP, 2010).

The call to increase efficiency and effectiveness has led many public administration and political science scholars to conduct research on administrative reform. According to Heinrich Siedentop (1982), "Administrative reform is not to be defined as primarily through the number of internal changes taking place in public agencies. Rather, it is an organizational, instrumental, or program-related change of government and the public sector to meet environmental

demands and requirements.” “Public Administration Reform can be very comprehensive and include process changes in areas such as organizational structures, decentralization, personnel management, public finance, result-based management, and regulatory reforms. It can also refer to targeted reforms such as the revision of the civil service statute” (UNDP and Public Administration Reform, 2004). Gerald E. Caiden (1969) defined administrative reform as “the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance.” Wallis (1989) defined administrative reform (AR) as “An induced, permanent improvement in administration.” Chapman and Greenway (1980) define AR as “The process of making changes in administrative structures or procedures within the public services because they have become out of line with the expectations of the social and political environment”. In light of above definitions, I can define AR as a process of change which boosts greater efficiency and professionalism among public service providers.

### **A. Significance**

The focus here is on reform in law enforcement and the overhaul of bureaupathologies, unnecessary rules and regulations, and red tape, which have created long term dissatisfaction among the citizens of developing countries (Khan, 2002). Also, a second area of focus is the role of public administrators as active agents of social change, scientifically examining on five approaches: participation, clientele relationships, pursuit of public interest, accountability, and self-control (Gruber, 1987). The specific policy that is to be examined is law enforcement. Bureaucrats in South Asian countries remain aloof from ordinary citizens, especially in law enforcement. There is a considerable power distance between administrators and general masses. Although citizens are thought of as the ultimate sources of power, neither elected officials nor bureaucrats give citizens priority

for their participation in the decision making. I posit that the above five approaches will be able to reduce the gap between service provider and service receiver which will engender trust between the two parties. The purpose is to provide better comprehension as well as important insights about how to make bureaucracy more responsive and efficient (Hoque, 2012). It is important to note here that administrative reform is sometimes used as administrative change, which reveals essential remedies for maladministration, minimum inconvenience, formality on the public, and ways out for a good governance to foster social change in the long run (Miewald and Steinman, 1984). The overall purpose of this research is to determine the effectiveness of administrative reform in law enforcement and whether it can strengthen the administrative and managerial capacity of the bureaucrats in South Asian countries, primarily, in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

#### **B. Literature Review:**

Farazmand (2002) examined confusion over the meaning of reform. In the developed world, the term Administrative Reform (AR) was used to bring necessary changes in the administrative system when the civil servants failed to meet the expectations of the citizens. In the developing countries, it means modernization of their administration by using western notions. Tummala (2002) underscored the recommendations of the fifth fay commission in India. One of the important recommendations was downsizing bureaucracy. However, politicians didn't pay any heed to the recommendations. Haque (2002) addressed administrative reform in Hong Kong. He depicted government in Hong Kong did not interfere over market to determine the price of goods and services. Also, he observed less resistance to change from bureaucrats and politicians. Ridley (1982) examined whether administrative theories influence administrative reform initiatives in the contemporary world. He noted that administrators, as well as practitioners, gained their

problem solving skill from intellectual activities of the theorists. In addition, administrative theories provide much insight to the service providers to make hypotheses about the problems they solve. Ostrom (1982) suggested some conceptual developments and opportunities for administrative reform. He figured out that monopoly power of public agencies had a detrimental effect on administrative reform. He advocated for creating an environment for private enterprises which would create competition in the market. Therefore, citizens would get more choices and they would get value for money. Hilliard (1982) revealed human resource management problems in the African countries, which impeded administrative reform initiatives. Also, widespread corruption, fragile political institution, and absence of political leadership stopped all reform process. Wilenski (1982) pointed out that increased efficiency is a traditional idea of administrative reform. He put equal importance to political reform as well. According to peter, administrative reform alone is not good enough to bring a radical change in the society until political masters start practicing democracy. Political and administrative reforms are both necessary for social change. Sarkar (2004) provided much insight about the failure of administrative reform in Bangladesh. He argued that “lack of political commitment, the incapacity of the state, the clientele’s nature of Bangladesh politics, bureaucratic resistance, politicization, and corruption are perceived to be serious hurdles for the implementation of the administrative reform programs” (Sarkar, 2004). Khan (2002) focused on the resistance to Administrative Reforms in South Asian civil bureaucracies. He stated that lack of political will and commitment and the absence of political leadership are the main reasons not to succeed administrative reform in South Asian countries.

### **C. Theoretical framework**

I utilize scientific management and new public management (NPM) as the lens through which to view Administrative Reform. In short, I seek to answer the question: does Administrative Reform increase efficiency and effectiveness in law enforcement in developing countries? As the need to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of bureaucrats to meet the demands of the citizens, Fredrick W. Taylor, in his principles of scientific management, gave emphasis to increased economic efficiency to improve organizational productivity. He believed that employees' corruption and incompetence could be minimized by increasing their efficiency and productivity (Gruening, 2001). Although he ignored human relationships as well as interpersonal feelings of the workers and treated them as machines, for the question of efficiency and effectiveness, it follows that we should emphasize the principles of scientific management.

Secondly, today's business sectors are playing dominant roles, along with public sectors, in shaping and reshaping the economy of the developed and developing world (Blunt, 2002). Governmental initiatives are often criticized as ineffective, lethargic, and time-consuming compared to business sectors. Therefore, there is a tendency to introduce the private sector's practices in the public sector to make a new promise to the citizens regarding quality service delivery in every aspect of their life. New Public Management (NPM) is a model, which has been adopted by many developed countries like the U.S.A., U.K., New Zealand, Australia, and Canada to make their administration more accountable, transparent, and service-oriented (Haque, 2004). Thus, the second point of emphasis will be on new public management (NPM) and the level of success across the three areas measured above.

NPM is a major paradigm shift in traditional public administration, which emphasizes contracting out, market-type mechanisms, improvement of performance, downsizing, and customer satisfaction (Islam, 1993). As a global phenomenon, NPM advocates organizational restructuring to meet the need of the citizens. Downsizing, continuous improvements of performance, and contracting out have become popular in the developed world (Hood, 1991). In the US, a government of divided ideologies purports to try to reduce the size of the government to minimize waste and corruption. Some of the budget cuts at the federal and local level remind us about the commitment of the government to NPM principles. According to NPM, the size of the government should always be small. Big government always creates some room for corruption and waste of public money, whereas a small government prevents venality by monitoring their daily activities as well as holding them more accountable (Kettl, 2015). Outside of the U.S. contracting out has become popular in African and Latin American countries as well. Contracting out and continuous performance improvement have also gained popularity both inside and outside of the U.S. (Hilliard, 1982). Government-by-proxy, also known as contracting out, is used widely by federal, state, and local governments to save time and money. Continuous improvement of service helps service providers to receive feedback from customers (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993).

Christopher Hood, a political scientist at Oxford University, first introduced the term NPM when a group of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries undertook public sector reform by focusing on more transparent, accountable, and customer oriented public administration (OECD, 2001). The origin of NPM resembles Managerialism, which was launched by Margaret Thatcher, the then

British Prime Minister, to make civil service more service oriented. Managerialism can be defined as “the application of managerial techniques of business to the running of other organizations, such as the civil service or local authorities” (Greenwood and Wilson, 1989). Margaret Thatcher, who was known as Iron Lady during her tenure, compelled bureaucrats to meet the needs and demands of the customers. Because of her uncompromising mentality and political leadership, civil servants were forced to change their mentality (Christopher and Summa, 1997).

#### **D. Research Questions (RQ)**

**RQ1-** How can Administrative Reform be used to increase efficiency and responsiveness of the bureaucrats in law enforcement in developing countries?

**RQ2-** Which types of reform efforts have been successful and which factors lead them to be successful?

**RQ3-** Which types of reform initiatives have been failures and why were those reforms unsuccessful?

**RQ4-** Are Administrative Reform initiatives in developed countries unique? If yes, why and how?

**RQ5-** Are recommendations or suggestions given by the reform committee and commission being implemented irrespective of developed and developing countries?

#### **E. Method/ Nature of the study**

In contemporary research, qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods are widely used by the nature of the problem being studied. This study is based on

qualitative methods. “Qualitative research is about exploring issues, understanding phenomenon, and answering questions by analyzing and making sense of unstructured data. It is a traditional method of data collection, which is frequently used in the social sciences” (McDavid, Huse, and Hawthorn, 2004). Although there are several categories of qualitative research like interviews, focus groups and observation, I will collect data and information from secondary sources like books, peer-reviewed journals, magazines, newspaper, and direct observation to analyze the phenomena of administrative reform in the developing countries mentioned above.

#### **F. Why India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh?**

These three South Asian countries have almost similar colonial legacies and the bureaucracies of these states are highly influenced by the British system. In fact, Britain created its colonial administration on the Asian subcontinent, not to give service general population, but to exploit them. In order to achieve their goals, a highly centralized bureaucracy was generated, which was used as a weapon to maintain law and order. Bureaucracy in these three countries is characterized by elitism and ivory towers, resulting in a patron-client relationship used to control and oppress general people. The Indian Civil Service (ICS) was created to serve the interest of the British (Tummala, 1994). After the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was created. Bureaucracy in Pakistan holds numerous powers because of the weakness of the democratic system. Elected governments in Pakistan cannot continue their tenure because of the political unrest and military interference over governance practices (Khan, 2007). For example, President Pervez Musharraf, former army chief of Pakistan, came to power in a military coup in 1999. He forced to resign the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif before

his tenure had come to an end. There is a common tendency among bureaucrats to undermine other professional organizations, and among the various cadres in the civil service, lack of cooperation and coordination is seen frequently. Corruption, mistrust, formalism, and elitism are all common characteristics of Pakistani bureaucracy (Khan, 2001).

Bangladesh was born as an independent nation after a destructive war with Pakistan in 1971. After establishing its independence, the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) was created to meet the expectation of the general people. The BCS was a successor of the CSP and almost all bureaupathologies are the same in Pakistan and Bangladesh civil service practices. Bureaucracy in Bangladesh has failed to meet the expectation of its citizens. Inefficiency, corrupt practices, and elitist mentality are some common characteristics in the civil service system (Jahan, 2006). Although there is a cosmetic change in the name of the civil service system, bureaucracy in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh belong to the same colonial mentality. Also, politicized bureaucracy is a concern for all three countries. It has been the experience that officers who are talented, efficient, and honest are being ignored by the politicians because they do not have political affiliation. At the same time, administrators who have low-standards and less efficiency are being promoted to the higher and vital posts because of party affiliation (Jahan, 2012). Therefore, these partisan bureaucrats remain busy implementing the party agenda. Customer dissatisfaction has long been a core issue in South Asian countries. At last, there is a greater similarity in the bureaucratic culture of the South Asian countries, particularly India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. In addition, they have similar colonial backgrounds and bureaucrats

demonstrate the same treatment of their clients. All of these common features allow comparison across the policy area.

## **II. Historical background of India**

Before 1947, India belonged to the British Empire. The East India Company conducted its business in India for almost one hundred years. The British government took absolute control over Indian internal affairs after the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857. This dominating and authoritative mentality of the British government instigated India to a nationalist movement. As a result, many leaders were created. Mahatma Gandhi, for example, a great leader of India, launched a movement called Salt Satyagraha. This movement challenged the British government's monopoly rule over salt production. Since salt is necessary in everyday life, Gandhi realized that the British government could not prevent Indian people from producing salt in their home country. He, along with his followers, moved to the sea and inspired people to make salt without any fear, which was a violation of British rule. As a leader of the Indian people, he launched two other movements; Noncooperation 1919-1922, and the Quit Movement between 1940 and 1942 (Majumder, 2010). After the Second World War, the British government understood that it would no longer be capable of ruling and controlling the Indian people.

Most of the Muslims did not enjoy the independence, which was gained from the British because they thought that the new constitution would serve the interest of the Hindu majority. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, explained the reason for creating a separate state for the Muslims. Gandhi and other INC leaders seriously opposed the creation of two separate states for Hindu and Muslim people. Finally, India and Pakistan emerged as two separate independent nations on August 15, 1947 (Rai, 2012).

#### **A. Organizational structure of Indian Police**

The Indian Police hierarchy can be divided into three ranks with vertical alignment: senior officers, upper subordinates, and police constabulary. The Director General of Police is at the top of the hierarchy (see chart1, pp. 46). Most of the officers at the senior level come from the Indian Police Service (IPS) through competitive examination. These senior officers perform supervisory activities in their respective departments. They also give advice to the government related to police matters. Seven other senior officers for example, commissioner of police, deputy commissioner of police, senior superintendent of police, superintendent of police, additional deputy commissioner of police, assistant commissioner of police, and superintendent of police work under the supervision of DGP. The upper subordinate rank starts with the inspector of police and under his supervision sub-inspector of police, assistant sub-inspector of police, and station house of police work. Basically, they work in the police station and take care of regular policing activities and also assist senior officers in different departments. The police constabulary is at the lowest level in the hierarchy. Their main functions are to maintain law and order (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2001). They are also responsible for guard duties, surveillance,

and patrolling. The hierarchy starts with police head constable and, under his supervision, senior police constable and police constable works.

## **B. Problems in Law enforcement**

- 1. Torture and violence:** Torture and violence are common practices in the law enforcement agency in India. It includes physical and mental torture, rape, humiliations, forced detention, and death in custody. Very rarely do police personnel disclose this misconduct and when someone dies in custody by torture the law enforcement agency is reluctant to conduct proper investigation. Moreover, they obfuscate by claiming that the victim committed suicide or the victim was killed in an encounter (Shinar, 2009). The worst victims of torture and violence are the poor and socially marginalized people who do not have political clout to influence the police personnel to launch a credible and fair investigation.
- 2. Disappearances:** Disappearance happens when a person dies by torture of the law enforcement agency. The main intention of the disappearance is to cover the deadly incident, which might keep them from giving an explanation as to why a person died in police custody. Among the detainees, many people have disappeared after encountering police personnel (Shinar, 2009). Year after year, the victims' families try to figure out the facts, but very few of them get accurate information regarding whether they have been killed or not.
- 3. Corruption:** Corruption is a common problem in South Asian countries and it has become institutionalized by law enforcement agencies. From the lower levels to higher levels, many police officers are involved with corruption.

Bribery is the most common form of corruption among the police officers, which they often demand and take without any hesitation or fear. When someone is arrested by the law enforcement agency torture results when the detainee or his family does not pay enough money. The rampant and widespread corruption problem reveals the inability, as well as unwillingness, of the law enforcement authorities to bring an end to the corruption problem (Tiwari, 2013).

4. **Lack of norms and due process:** Police personnel are blamed for not following proper organizational norms and procedures. For example, people who are arrested by suspicion are not given opportunity to meet their family members. Sometimes they arrest people without having a warrant, which explains why a person is arrested. Among the detainees, most of them must stay in jail for a long time without being shown a valid reason by the law enforcement agency (Tiwari, 2013).
5. **Non-registration of FIR:** The FIR (First Information Report) is a crucial document in Indian law, which can initiate the investigation process. It is important to note here that many cases are filed and investigated without registering a FIR, which leads to police force corruption, particularly bribery. Non-registration cases are common in law enforcement agencies and it is one of the most common problems in police administration in India. For all non-registration cases, police demand extremely high bribes, which creates misery for the weaker section of the society (Tiwari, 2013).

### **C. Reforms efforts**

The National Police Commission (NPC) was formed in 1979 by the Indian government to review the role and performance of the police. The NPC gave a total of seven reports to the government from 1979 to 1981 focusing on living conditions of the constabulary, power and responsibilities of the police, criminal investigation, methods of recruitment and promotion, police leadership, organizational structure, and police accountability (Sharma & Thakur, 2013). In 1996, two retired police officers filed a case in the Supreme Court regarding public interest. They requested the court to give directions to the government of India to implement the recommendations of the National Police Commission (NPC). According to these directions, the Ribeiro Committee was formed in May 1996. This committee submitted two reports. The first report was related with the Supreme Court's concern. The second report emphasized a wide range of issues, including the creation of a police performance and accountability commission, police establishment board, and rewards and punishments system for the police force (Sharma & Thakur, 2013). In January 2000, the government of India formed another committee to bring police reform that was known as the Padmanabhaiah Committee. This committee was formed to overhaul the police structure in India. One of the important aspects of this committee was to examine the challenges that the police force might face in the next millennium, for example, organized crime, militancy, and terrorism etc. (Sharma & Thakur, 2013). The central government of India set up another committee in 2005 which was known as the Police Act Drafting Committee. This committee gave important recommendations to the Indian government by focusing on bringing changes in the attitudes of the police

personnel in order to meet the expectations of the community. Also, the committee highlighted some societal issues, including human rights violations, violence against women, and people belonging to Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes (Sharma & Thakur, 2013). Two former Directors General of Police (DGPs) in 1996 filed a case in the Supreme Court that was known as Prakash Singh and Others vs Union of India. The court gave its ruling on 2006 by asking the central and state governments when police reforms would be implemented. Also, it gave seven directions including the formation of a state security commission, recruitment of the police chief, tenure of the police officers, separation between law and order and investigation, police establishment board, police complaints authority, and national security commission (Sharma & Thakur, 2013).

#### **D. Success and failure of the reforms**

Although different commissions and committees were formed to make police administration more professional, accountable, transparent, and service-oriented, very little progress has been achieved to implement the recommendations given by the committees and commissions. Even the seven step directions that were given by the Supreme Court to make police officers more professional were not implemented by the central and local governments (Kumar, 2013). For example, out of twenty-nine states, twenty-five states formed an independent state security commission to prevent police from engaging in illegal activities. The Rajasthan state created the Security Commission according to the direction of the Supreme Court. Only two states, Arunachal and Nagaland, undertook the guidance of the Supreme Court for the selection and removal of the DGP. Out of twenty-nine states, only sixteen states enacted the new police act and

only two states amended their old police law (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2011). Therefore, corruption, brutality and other problems continue to exist.

#### **E. Obstacles to reform:**

- 1. Political unwillingness:** It is a common scenario in South Asian countries that political elites use police administration for their own interests. Therefore, they are reluctant to bring changes to the police sector. Police forces are obligated to carry out all unlawful orders given by the political masters to cover up political failures of the ruling party in India because the political class directly influences their transfer and promotion from one place to another and also from lower posts to higher posts. Since political parties can use police as a convenient tool for their self-gain, there is no reason for them to show willingness towards reform (Tiwari, 2013).
- 2. Change of the regime:** When a government comes to power it shows serious antipathy about the initiatives taken by the previous government. It is a common culture in South Asian countries that newly elected governments reject all previous governments' activities, no matter its importance. Also, the politicians cannot escape their partisan point of view. Without reason, they criticize the good initiatives of the ruling party, which is in power (Bihari, 2013).
- 3. Financial constraints:** As a developing country in South Asia, India has so many issues which need urgent attention. For example, poverty and unemployment both are core issues for Indian government. Many committees and commissions give their recommendations for police reform, because of the resource constraints, elected governments cannot implement the recommendations (Srinivasan, 2013).

**4. Organizational culture:** Misuse of power is a common practice in police organizations. Police personnel work under such an environment where negative attitudes, oppressive behavior, and unjust dealings are common practices and most of the police officers are not willing to change this culture. Some police officers enjoy the power they have and they do not want to lose these powers. Moreover, some officers think that the existing set up is good for them and they have a fear that the new system may not be as suitable for them (Srinivasan, 2013).

**F. Recommendations:**

1. Police administration should be free from political influence.
2. State government should have control over police administration.
3. In every state, a state security commission should be formed to prevent police from engaging all illegal activities (Iyer, 2004).
4. The appointment of the DGP (Director General of Police) will be by state government rather than central government. Among the three senior officers in the department one person should be recruited as DGP based on academic records (Agarwal, 2014).
5. The tenure of the senior level officers should not be more than two years, including DGP so that other talented officers can get the opportunity to hold the post.
6. There should be a clear distinction between the law and order functions and investigation functions.
7. Each and every state should form an independent police complaints authority to receive grievance from the citizens ((Martensson, 2006).

8. It is the responsibility of the central government to form a national security commission, which will scrutinize the performance of police personnel.

### **III. Historical background of Pakistan**

Pakistan was created as an independent state on August 14, 1947 based on the two-nation theory led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, an exceptionally brilliant and prominent lawyer. Under his leadership, the Muslim League was formed as a counter to the Indian National Congress (INC) led by the Hindu majority. During the British period in India approximately 25% of the populations were Muslims. As a result, the Muslim League was formed to promote the rights of Muslim populations and also to protect all racial discriminations by Hindus (Adnan, 2006). There are several factors, which led Pakistan to be an independent nation. First, the religious differences between Muslims and Hindus sparked the idea of creating a separate state. Muslims have strong and absolute faith and belief in the doctrine of one God, while Hindus have strict adherence to multiple Gods. Cow meat is perceived to be the most delicious food among the Muslim community. On the other hand, Hindus believe the cow is a symbol of God and they not only prohibit eating cow meat but also consider it a sin. Secondly, Muslims were the minority in British-India. Most of the Muslim leaders feared that if India became free from British rule it would form a constitution and government of its own to promote the rights of the majority Hindu people, which afterward might hamper the religious and social freedom of the Muslim people. Finally, Muslims thought that they would be treated as slaves of the Hindus like Shudras, which are lower castes in the Hindu religion. However, Jawaharlal Nehru, a prominent leader of the INC tried to create harmony among Muslims and Hindus.

He had an inclination to keep both communities united for the greater interest of India, but he failed to gain substantial support from the other members of the INC. The communal riot between Hindus and Muslims that started at Calcutta spread to Dhaka, Bihar, Bombay and Lahore, injuring 20,000 people and making 100,000 people homeless (Aziz, 2007). As a consequence of the communal riot, two separate nations emerged. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was formed on August 14, 1947 and on August 15, 1947 the Republic of India was created.

### **A. Organizational structure of Pakistan Police**

The organizational hierarchy of Pakistan Police is based on the three categories: Gazette officers, upper subordinates, and lower subordinates. Gazette officers represent ASP and above. ASI to Inspector belongs to upper subordinates. Lower subordinates are comprised of constable to head constable. The IGP is the highest level officer and constable is the lowest level personnel in the hierarchy of police administration in Pakistan (see chart2, pp. 47-48). He is also known as a Provincial Police Officer (PPO), who leads and supervises the police department in the province. Under the supervision of the IGP, Additional Inspector General, Deputy Inspector General, and Senior and Deputy Superintendents work in the hierarchy of the Pakistan police organization. The IGP in Pakistan police administration is responsible to the provincial government for all law and order related activities and is appointed by the federal government. The provincial Home and Finance Department approves the budget for the provincial police. The district is the territorial administrative unit in Pakistan headed by a District Police Officer (DPO), an equivalent rank of a Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP). Each district is composed of some sub-divisions which are headed by the officers of the rank of ASP or DSP. Again, all

sub-divisions are divided into police stations, headed by Inspectors and based on population and area. Every police station is comprised of police outposts, which conduct policing activities in the remote areas where police stations cannot operate because of the distant geographical location (Human Rights Commission, 2010).

### **B. Problems in Law enforcement:**

- 1. Corruption:** In Pakistan police administration, corruption is rampant and spread from higher-level to lower-level officers in the state and provincial level. Although the judiciary is free from the executive branch's influence, the formal investigation authority against corruptions goes to the National Accountability Bureau, which is responsible to the Ministry of Law. Both organizations work under political influences and cannot make decisions independently. In the U.S. for example, the director of the FBI is appointed for 10 years, no matter which party is in power. Before his tenure expires, even the President himself cannot remove him or her from the post. In Pakistan, the director of the FIA and the Accountability Bureau changes when a different government comes to power (Shigri, 2012).
- 2. Lack of career advancement in the lower ranks:** The police structure in Pakistan is still guided by British colonial rule, which was created by the British government in the Asian-subcontinent to oppress and control general people. In the lower-level posts uneducated and semiliterate people are being recruited who do not know how to serve citizens and how to deliver quality service. Most of the constables and head constables do not have any prospects for career advancement (Shigri, 2012). They are not given any training to keep pace with the modern challenges. Until their retirement, most of the lower level personnel remain in the same position. Very few of them are promoted.

- 3. Political influence in hiring:** At almost every level, promotion, transfer, training, and rewards are the subject of political considerations. Politicians have absolute control over the promotion to higher posts. In South Asian countries, honest and competent police officers are often ignored and deprived, while less competent and partisan people often get priority to be promoted to the higher posts. Therefore, they serve the party in power and help to implement all vested interests (Shigri, 2012).
- 4. Deplorable working conditions:** In Pakistan, police personnel need to work for a long time since they need to fight with terrorists and organized criminals. Most of the lower level officers do not get proper accommodation facilities. In Islamabad, only 5% of constables and head constables get accommodation facilities. As a result, the remaining police force needs to stay outside of the police station, which creates extra financial burden on them. Most of them live in the slum areas because of their poor salaries and the high standard of living in the Islamabad area (Shigri, 2012). These low level police officers make a nexus with slum-based criminals and help them to commit crime for financial gains.
- 5. Feudal mentality:** Most of the higher ranked officers treat lower ranking officers as their servants. The demoralizing behavior and feudal mindset of the top level officers create frustration among the lower level officers. Sometimes, they are given disciplinary punishment by the senior officers without documented reasons. The patron-client relationship among the top and low level officers in the police administration in Pakistan not only destroys organizational unity but also destroys mutual trust and respect among them (Shigri, 2012).

### **C. Reforms efforts:**

In 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan approved the metropolitan system of policing in Karachi. His intention was to make police more professional and apolitical (Khosa, 2012). In 1958, the martial law ruler, General Ayub Khan introduced bureaucratic control over the activities of the police by the district magistrate, which was laid out in the Police Act of 1861. His intention was to make the police administration more accountable and transparent (Khosa, 2012). Prime Minister Newaz Sharif launched reform in the traffic laws by creating the National Highway and Motorway Police in Lahore and Islamabad in 1991. He was motivated by the western traffic system. In order to make smooth traffic discipline, the existing police officers were given training by U.K. police and new police officers were recruited based on merit. The salary of motorway police was three times higher than provincial police (Khosa, 2012). In 2001, General Pervez Musharraf promulgated Police Order 2002 by creating a politically non-biased, highly accountable and extremely professional police organization. Police Order 2002 emphasized numerous issues like corruption, misuse of power, political interference, and misbehavior (Abbas, 2009). In order to fight with terrorists in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, special police units were created in 2007. With a view to fulfill the shortage on the police force, the government recruited new police officers and also hired personnel on contract basis (Abbas, 2009).

#### **D. Success and failure of the reforms:**

1. After the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah the bureaucrats were reluctant to implement the idea of a metropolitan system of policing in Karachi and therefore the idea of creating an honest and professional police administration remained elusive (Tarar, 2012).
2. The bureaucratic control over the activities of the police introduced by General Ayyub Khan was transferred to the Judicial Magistrates under the Law Ordinance of 1972. By this ordinance, the powers of District Magistrate were weakened regarding its control over serious crime (Tarar, 2012).
3. The introduction of the National Highway and Motorway police was appreciated by the general people and it reduced traffic problems in Lahore and Islamabad. Moreover, the new salary system attracted many talented young university graduates who had a strong desire to serve the country (Rana, 2012).
4. Police Order 2002 was not implemented throughout the country. An important aspect of the Police Order 2002 was to create the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC), whose intention was to promote quality of service, was not implemented by the political government (Rana, 2012).
5. The creation of special police units to fight against terrorists in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province achieved important progress since its inception. Police officers are getting frequent training and using sophisticated weapons to fight with Taliban (Rana, 2012).

## **E. Obstacles to reform:**

- 1. Political instability and lack of political will:** Democracy in Pakistan remains hostage under the frequent military interference with the elected government. Neither military rulers nor the elected governments paid attention, making police administration more professional, efficient, transparent, and accountable. Rather, whoever came to power always used police administration for their own interest. Only a committed democratically elected government can undertake thorough reform activities (Suddle, 2012).
- 2. Inadequate Professional leadership:** In the police administration those who hold important positions are all politically motivated and do not care about reform. As honest and sincere officers remain aloof from the key post, the impoverished leadership of the partisan officers cannot put enough pressure for reform on their political masters (Suddle, 2012).
- 3. Poor police performance appraisal system:** In Pakistan, performance appraisal is based on an annual confidential report given by the senior officer. Professional integrity, sincerity, and honesty are not given much weight at the time of promotion. In the prescribed in-service training, officers who hold the top three positions are considered for promotion to the next rank. The fact is that, based on merit, very few officers obtain these distinctions. Rather, they secure these positions by giving bribes or otherwise influencing the examiner (Haider, 2012).
- 4. Corruption and Accountability:** It is not surprising at all that police are among the most corrupt public servants in Pakistan. In order to stop corruption, a good pay scale is necessary. Also, all corrupt officers must get proper punishment. At the same time,

officers who are honest should get proper reward so that they can feel motivation for their work. All police officers must come under a proper accountability system, which will create a good image among the public. Historically, police administration has a negative and poor reputation among the public in Pakistan. By combating corruption and ensuring proper accountability system, the government of Pakistan can restore the people's confidence, which will foster police reform initiatives (Haider, 2012).

#### **F. Recommendations:**

1. Police Order 2002 should be implemented thoroughly. The idea of a National Public Safety Commission (NPSC) is seen as effective, which will work as a watchdog to promote and protect citizens' right (Asad, 2012).
2. Police administration should be free from political influence and promotion to higher posts should be based on merit, professional integrity, honesty, and sincerity.
3. A good pay scale can attract talented people who can serve the country with utmost sincerity and honesty (Tajik, 2012).
4. Corruption is one of the biggest impediments to reform initiatives. An independent anti-corruption commission can be formed to check all corrupt practice of the civil servants, including police administration. This commission should get autonomous power to investigate any kind of corruption. At the time of promotion, officers who are engaged in corruption should be avoided and ignored (Tajik, 2012).

5. The idea of creating ombudsmen can be a good initiative to check corruption. In Sweden, the idea has become very popular and perceived to be a strong device to overcome administrative corruption (Tajik, 2012).
6. An independent Human Rights Commission can be formed to check the violation of human rights.
7. Since the Judiciary is independent in Pakistan, it can intervene in the investigation process of any criminal offense committed by police personnel (Asgar, 2012).
8. The tenure of the director of FBI and the National Accountability Bureau should be at least 10 years. Neither President nor Prime Minister should have the power to terminate him or her until the term expires (Asad, 2012).

#### **IV. Historical Background of Bangladesh**

Bangladesh as an independent nation was created by several transformations, particularly of British India and then of Pakistan from 1947 through 1971. In 1947, the partition of Bengal generated two separate entities, which were known as West Bengal and East Bengal. West Bengal belonged to India and still remains a province of the Republic of India. On the other hand, East Bengal belonged to Pakistan which was later known as East Pakistan. East Pakistan later became independent in 1971 and emerged as Bangladesh. Before the War of 1971, many Bengali Muslim elites had an unconditional allegiance to West Pakistan and were serving the greater interest of Pakistan. However, the distribution of power and privilege between the elites of West and East Pakistan led to the conflict of 1971(Iqbal, 2014).

As Pakistan was created by a majority of the Muslim people, both East and West Pakistan tried to remain united for their religious spirit. East and West Pakistan had population of 85% and 97% Muslims respectively. West Pakistan had four provinces; Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the North-West frontiers. East Pakistan was known as its fifth province. In order to take control over East Pakistan as its province, West Pakistan made significant investment in East Pakistan to export goods abroad. Therefore, many fabric mills were created. From 1948 to 1960, East Pakistan exported 70% of the total trade. However, it received only 25% of the profits from the total trades. East Pakistan had eleven fabric mills, while West Pakistan had nine mills in 1948 (Iqbal, 2014). Because of

the political turmoil, by 1971 the number of fabric mills in West Pakistan increased to 150, while the number decreased in East Pakistan to 26. In this time period, approximately \$2.6 billion worth of resources were transferred from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. Among all the provinces of Pakistan, East Pakistan had the largest population. However, it experienced serious discrimination economically and politically. All these incidents created enormous dissatisfaction among the people and political leaders. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of the nation, raised his voice against all disparity and explicitly demanded more economic and political power. The Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, took part in the general election of Pakistan in 1970. The election of 1970 was known as a free, fair, and credible election. Although 24 political parties participated in the election, the Awami League, Bengalis Nationalist Party, was able to influence the general people of East Pakistan by focusing on the Six-Points Program (SPP) and won a landslide victory by capturing 160 seats in the National Assembly. Although this unanimous victory gave Sheikh Mujib to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the chair of Pakistan People's Party, denied him the position. This incident led to the War of Independence in 1971 (Khan, 2010).

There was a language issue which also initiated the liberation war. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, first Governor-General of Pakistan, declared at Dhaka (the Capital City of Bangladesh) that Urdu would be the official language of Pakistan. He did not realize the majority of people of East Pakistan spoke Bangla. In West Pakistan, Muhajir and Biharis spoke Urdu. The remaining West Pakistani people spoke Punjabi and Sindhi. The East Pakistani people and political leaders rejected the speech of Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Finally, the language issue and economic discrimination between East and West Pakistan led to the war of Independence in 1971 (Khan, 2010).

### **A. Organizational structure of Bangladesh Police**

As a national organization, Bangladesh police follows a top-down hierarchy in its organizational structure. The headquarters of Bangladesh police is located in Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh. The Ministry of Home Affairs is the regulatory authority of Bangladesh Police regarding its annual budget, appointment, and transfer of all personnel other than the rank of superintendent. The police department is composed of several branches, including traffic, an armed police battalion, a criminal investigation department (CID), special branch (SB), and rapid action battalion (RAB), which is an elite force to investigate serious crime, including terrorism activity. Metropolitan police and range police are divided into district, circles, and thana.

In Bangladesh Police Administration, The Inspector General of Police (IGP) holds the top-most position in the hierarchy and is the key officer in police administration who is appointed by the central government. Under the supervision of the IGP, two Additional Inspector General (AIGs) are entrusted to act as heads of major departments in the police administration. A Deputy Inspector General (DIG) holds the position below the AIG in the hierarchy who conducts functions within each range (see chart3, pp.49). The Superintendent of Police (SP) who ranks after the DIG is responsible to all district level functions, including the detention, investigation, and prevention of crime. In Bangladesh, there are eighteen ranks in the police administration. Again, these eighteen ranks can be divided into three broad categories such as gazetted ranks, upper subordinate ranks, and lower subordinate ranks (UNDP, 2014). The gazetted ranks are constituted by the IGP,

AIGs, DIGs, and the Superintendents of Police (SPs). The rank of inspector, sub-inspector, town sub-inspector, sergeant, and assistant sub-inspector belong to the upper subordinate position. In the hierarchy, head constable, naiks and constables occupy the lower subordinate rank. Gazetted ranked officials are well-trained, well-paid, and represent important positions while lower subordinate ranked personnel are ill-paid, poorly-trained, and overworked.

## **B. Problems in Law enforcement**

- 1. Politicization:** Bangladesh police administration is facing an image crisis as elected officials use them as their political weapon to attain their vested political interests. After independence almost every government used police administration as their party cadre to detain opposition party leaders, put them into jail, and also used them for torture and oppression of general people, students, and civil society members. The overwhelming politicization of police administration has caused a loss of credibility with the general people. In Bangladesh, promotion and transfer to the higher posts is a political consideration, no matter if it is civil administration or police administration. Officers involved with party politics get preference in promotion to the upper important posts. Although politicians get elected by direct mandate of the general people, to retain power they must have more loyalty to the police administration rather than citizens. In Bangladesh, at the time of election, whether national level or local level, member of the Parliament of the ruling party manipulate election results, which is known as election engineering with the help of police administration and therefore are rewarded by the party in power. Through this politicization process, very few police officers gain financial and promotional benefits. Very often, elected officials and party cadres are

involved with serious criminal offenses, including financial corruption or even killing people. As an agent of the government, police should investigate from a neutral point of view. However, through pressure of political masters, they are forced to hide actual offenses and submit an investigation report according to the will of the concerned minister. At the university level, the student wing of the political party uses police administration to protect and prevent an opposition party student wing and it is very common in public universities in Bangladesh that by the shelter of police, the student wing of the ruling party physically assaults, and even kills member of the opposition party student wing (International Crisis Group, 2009).

- 2. Corruption:** Police corruption is perceived to be an age-old problem in Bangladesh. Poor salary structure, lack of accountability, inadequate budget, and poor recruitment processes prompt low level police officers to engage in corrupt practices. Transparency International Bangladesh, a non-political organization, conducted a survey in 2011 and reported that 82% Bangladesh citizens believe that police administration is the most corrupt institution in Bangladesh. 84% of the general population admitted that they had to give bribes in the last 12 months. In Bangladesh police administration, bribes are used widely for recruitment, transfer, and promotion. In mid and low- level recruitment, applicants are asked to give a large amount of money to high-level officers no matter how competent they are and how well they perform in the written and oral examinations. At the entry level, when an applicant needs to give a bribe for the post he is seeking, after joining the post they become corrupt to recoup the money they had to pay at the entry level. Once they are involved in corrupt practices, they cannot escape. In Bangladesh police administration, transfer from one metropolitan area to

another area is a very lucrative business for the political leaders. Based on the area, they demand different amounts of money and the officer who is lobbying for transfer agrees to pay the money because, within one year, he will be able to recover this money. For many police officers, this is a kind of investment and, after getting the permission order for transfer from the concerned minister, they try to recoup their investment (International Crisis Group, 2009).

- 3. Violation of human rights:** Human rights violations by law enforcement agencies are a daily occurrence in Bangladesh and it is increasing dramatically because of the absence of proper judicial and administrative control over the activities of the police. The worst victims of human rights violation are women, particularly garment workers and sex workers, opposition political party leaders and activists, and students. In Bangladesh, many female workers are working from morning to late at night in the garment industry. When these female workers return home at night after finishing their job, some police personnel treat them as sex workers and force them to have sexual intercourse. There are many garment workers who became victims of group rape by the low level police force, particularly at night. These female workers do not report these occurrences because of the threat given by these law enforcement personnel. Some sex workers who work for their livelihood are frequently tortured by the police force. During the day the police give them protection for their work and at nighttime police personnel take advantage of them by compelling them to sexual activity. These workers are helpless and neglected by society and therefore, all these heinous activities by the low level police personnel never come to light (International Crisis Group, 2009).

**4. Political turmoil and instability:** Political turmoil and instability both are very common phenomenon in Bangladesh. The ruling government tries to oppress opposition party leaders and activists through law enforcement agencies by arbitrary arrest, physical assault, torture in jail, and lengthy pre-trial detention. Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), an elite force to maintain law and order, sometimes kills criminals and innocent people like students. This is known as extrajudicial killing and has been a subject matter of criticism by the local and international media. According to Odikar, a non-governmental organization based on human rights, among the law enforcement agencies in Bangladesh, RAB is considered to be the number one violator of human rights by extra judicial killings and cross-fire (International Crisis Group, 2009).

### **C. Reform efforts**

The Police Reform Program (PRP) is a continuous process in Bangladesh and is collaboration between UNDP and the Government of Bangladesh, which was started in 2005. Amendments are currently being made to the 1861 Police Act. For Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP), an amendment has been undertaken to foster more accountability and transparency of the daily activities of police personnel in the metropolitan areas. Under the PRP, the introduction of online services was suggested to give citizens more access to the service. One stop crisis centers have been proposed to create in all-inclusive administrative unit in Bangladesh for the victims, particularly women and children. In order to create more human resources, the creation of many training centers have been proposed. With a view to reduce gender discrimination, a good number of female police officers have been recruited under the suggestion of UNDP.

#### **D. Success and failure of the reforms:**

1. There has been significant progress in the amendment of the Bangladesh Police Act 1861, which was enacted by the British colonial authorities to control and oppress the general population rather than to protect them from crisis and danger. This law made police administration accountable to the state government instead of the general population. In offers to revise this law, a committee was formed and submitted its report to the Ministry of Home Affairs which is a concern Ministry for law enforcement agency (The FE Report, 2012).
2. A gender and anti-discrimination policy has been finalized with the support of PRP and therefore, more female police offices are being recruited. For example, in 2012, 1524 women police officers were recruited in various positions of Bangladesh police administration, which indicates that 525 more women police were employed than the year before. (UNDP,2014).
3. In 2012, Victim Support Center (VSC) was created to provide service to the marginalized groups such as women and children in Dhaka and Rangamati, a hill and tribal area in Bangladesh, under the supervision of PRP (International Crisis Group, 2009).
4. In the capital city of Dhaka, citizens are allowed to file on online General Diary (GD) about any threat or risk they feel is harmful to them. Also, citizens can get information about harassing, snatching, and theft or loss without visiting a police

station. These online services not only save their valuable time and money but also give them access to e-government facilities. In the past, victims needed to go to a police station to register complaints and often police officers would refuse to file cases. After introducing online services, there is less room for corruption and, moreover, citizens are getting quick services from the law enforcement agency (International Crisis Group, 2009).

5. In the capital city of Dhaka, a new training academy was established to provide training to police officers regarding crime scene management, how to write GD and FIRs, gender issues, victim support, human rights, and conflict resolution (UNDP, 2014).
6. Under the supervision of PRP, fifteen new Model Thana (Police Station) have been constructed to ensure quality service delivery (International Crisis Group, 2009).

#### **E. Obstacles to reform:**

1. **Inadequate political support:** After independence, no government undertook any initiatives to reform the Bangladesh police sector; rather, they utilized police forces to serve their vested interest. Donor agencies such as IMF and World Bank frequently exerted pressure to launch reform initiatives in order to ensure good governance. Although some reform initiatives have been carried out due to pressure of international actors, many of these reforms are not being implemented due to political unwillingness (The Daily Star, 2012).

- 2. The Bureaucracy:** The police ordinance of 2007 was suggested to increase autonomy of the police officers. Some civil bureaucrats who hold important posts in the different powerful ministries such as Ministry of Law, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Ministry of Defense oppose increasing the autonomy of the police because increased autonomy could make police administration more aggressive and reckless, reducing their accountability and transparency. Moreover, there is a hostile relationship between civil and police administration. In Bangladesh, civil administration plays a dominant role in public policy making and its implementation. Most of the civil bureaucrats in Bangladesh have a strong desire to oversee police administration (Huda, 2012).
- 4. Lack of organizational willingness to reform:** Most of the top ranked officers of the Bangladesh police are being recruited based on political affiliation. These partisan officials are known as “yes men.” They never criticize government policy; rather, they try to implement the party agenda by demonstrating unconditional allegiance to the party in power. Such politicized top level officials never come forward to raise their voice for reforms because they are more interested in achieving their personal interest (The Independent, 2012). Once an officer ascends to the top post, he enjoys protocol, VIP facilities, foreign tours, representing the county in different foreign forums and so on. After gaining all these perks, they ignore organizational needs and sometimes resist any reforms undertaken by the subordinate officers because it may create an awkward situation for the government.
- 5. Lack of coordination between Ministry of Home Affairs, Police Reform Program (PRP) and Bangladesh:** In Bangladesh, most of the reforms are

commencing with the help of UNDP and other donor agencies. What donor agencies think is right and applicable, the Ministry of Home Affairs (the supervising Ministry for Bangladesh Police) tries to overlook it. UNDP provides financial and technical assistance to the Bangladesh police to make it more efficient, transparent, and accountable. Sometime various departments and committees do not communicate with each other regarding technical and financial assistance (New Age, 2012). Therefore, slow progress and limited success are seen in the Police Reform Program which creates an overwhelming dissatisfaction among the donor agencies.

- 6. Absence of vibrant civil society:** The existence of a strong civil society is always conducive for the citizens because it holds governments more accountable and transparent for the policies they undertake. In a democracy, tax payers have a right to know “which policy reflect what?” “Who are the beneficiaries?” and “How is tax money being spent?” In Bangladesh, the absence of a strong and vibrant civil society makes the party in power more arbitrary, tarnishing democratic norms and values (The Daily Star, 2012). Although some print and electronic media sometimes highlight anomalies and criticize the activities of the government, this publicity is not enough to force government to implement changes.

#### **F. Suggestions:**

1. All police personnel should remain free from political influence.
2. Promotion should be based on professional integrity and merit rather than political ideology.
3. Human Rights Commission should strictly monitor and record violations of human rights of police personnel and submit an annual report about the human

rights violation to the Ministry of Home Affairs, a supervising ministry for Bangladesh Police Administration.

4. Police officers who are convicted of human rights violation should not be promoted and must be a subject to disciplinary action.
5. In the police administration, officers who are honest and sincere should be rewarded so that entry level officers see this and are motivated.
6. In order to stop corruption, a standard salary structure should be implemented so that all police personnel can maintain a decent standard of living.
7. Periodic citizen feedback should be used to ensure quality service delivery and professionalism in police administration.
8. Recruitment systems should be fair and competitive.
9. Modern technologies should be introduced in the daily activities of police officers. In order to increase more professional efficiency, more training academies should be established.
10. Frequent transfer and OSD (Officer on Special Duty- discharge an officer from his own duty) culture should be stopped.

## **V. Research findings**

After critically analyzing all reform attempts undertaken by the government of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, it can be summarized that political unwillingness, bureaucratic reluctance, and resistance to change from police administration are the biggest hindrances in police reform and its implementation. This scenario is almost identical in all three countries. Although different committees and commissions were formed to launch thorough police reform, the reality was that it has never been a core issue to policy makers; rather, they use it as means to come to the power by giving false promise to the fellow citizens. Myths and realities of police reforms have always been a romantic tragedy in South Asian countries. Policy makers fail to realize the urgency of police reform. Most of the police forces in South Asian countries are inefficient, corrupt, poorly trained, and inadequately supervised. They have a colonial mindset, which prevent them from serving people. Instead, they rule and control them, creating a patron client relationship among the police and citizens.

Police administration in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are facing a tremendous image crisis and it is increasing day by day. They have been charged with human rights violations and extra judicial killings; however, very few police officers are even punished for these unethical activities. Politicization of police administration is a common practice in South Asian countries. Promotion, transfer, and recruitment are based on political influence.

Therefore, they serve the interest of the party in power. Serving the public interest is rarely a priority to them. Finally, police administration in South Asian countries has failed to gain the trust of the citizens. The relationship between citizens and police is extremely unfriendly. Their authoritative behavior has created a sharp divide with citizens, which should be unexpected in democratic systems of government.

## **VI. Conclusion**

The urgency of reform in the police sector is increasing rapidly since police are perceived as the first line of defense in any country. In an era of globalization, police are not only involved with maintaining law and order, but also deal with a wide range of issues that are not criminal in nature. In order to meet all these challenges, the role of the police should be proactive rather than reactive, protagonist rather than antagonist, service oriented rather than rule oriented. Policy makers should realize that an honest and efficient police administration can become the central pillar of good governance. They should also be aware that failing to do so can bring about a collapse of the governance system. In fact, a sound policing system in a country represents its respect for civil liberty and rule of law. Unfortunately, in South Asian countries police have failed to create a positive image among the citizens.

Some common grievances against police are that they only serve the interest of the majority of the community and weaker sections of the society are always neglected and ignored by the police force. Because of the colonial mindset, their professionalism is at stake. They are perceived as being associated with corruption, extrajudicial killings, and are irresponsible and insensitive to the citizens. It is high time to change all the bad images by following a more flexible, transparent, and accountable approach. The political elite should observe the changing needs of the society. Police need to act as an agent of social change. In order to promote economic growth and social progress, police need to play a vital role. Innovative ideas and good research can make police more people-friendly. It is

expected that police administration will no longer be used as a political weapon and should remain free from all political influences helping to boost their professionalism. It is strongly believed that the best way of bringing about police reform is to put the issue in front of the public at large. When they realize the importance of police reform the public will automatically exert pressure on authority, which will be extremely difficult to ignore.

**List of Charts:**

Chart 1




Figure: Indian Police Service Hierarchy

Source: <http://www.hierarchystructure.com/indian-police-service-hierarchy/>

Chart 2




Figure: Indian Police Service Hierarchy

Source: [http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/police\\_organisations\\_in\\_pakistan.pdf](http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/police_organisations_in_pakistan.pdf).

Chart 3




Figure: Bangladesh Police Service Hierarchy

Source: <http://www.police.gov.bd>

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